July 1, 1863---The Battle of Gettysburg: Day One

JULY 1, 1863:   

The Battle of Gettysburg  (Day One):  

The battle that was destined to become the bloodiest in Civil War history is supposed to have started over shoes. The legend has grown up that there was a stockpile of army footgear in the small, sleepy Pennsylvania college town of 2,500, and that the ill-equipped but indefatigable Army of Northern Virginia sent men to get those boots and shoes. In reality, Jubal Early’s forces had entered Gettysburg on June 26^th and taken what supplies they could, but there was no legendary freight car of shoes to be had, then or now, five days later. In point of fact, Gettysburg was a meeting battle, where units of the United States and Confederate States armies happened to clash, bringing more troops to reinforce them, and eventually snowballing into the battle that decided the war.

Although the town itself had not much strategic importance, the spider’s web of roads which converged in the midst of Gettysburg made it a natural meeting place. The Rebels, some of them having gotten as far as the Susquehanna River facing Harrisburg, turned back to address the problem in their rear. One of the great ironies of Gettysburg is that the pursuing, defensive North came in from the south and the invading, offensive South came in from the north.

It had been General Robert E. Lee’s plan to threaten, or perhaps even to take, the cities of Harrisburg, Philadelphia and Washington, D.C. in order to force peace with the Union. Alexander H. Stephens (“Little Alec”), the Confederate Vice-President (who despised Confederate President Jefferson Davis and was a former friend of Abraham Lincoln’s) was convinced that the mere threat of a Confederate victory might be enough to secure Southern independence, and he implored Davis to restrain Lee from actually attacking anywhere. Instead, Little Alec went north, ostensibly to discuss Prisoner of War exchanges, but in actuality to place a peace proposal before Lincoln. Davis, who had no faith in Stephens but great faith in Lee and was becoming increasingly fixated on humiliating the North by way of victory, did not send to Lee asking him not to attack, and by the time Stephens met with any ranking Federal officers, the Union had won at Gettysburg, taken Vicksburg, and driven the Confederate army out of central Tennessee at Tullahoma. Stephens was sent back to his lines empty-handed.

And just as the Union had been blind to Lee’s approach to Pennsylvania through the Shenandoah Valley because of J.E.B. Stuart’s masterful blocking campaign at Aldie, Middleburg, and Upperville, Virginia, Lee now found himself similarly blinded by Stuart’s absence. After Upperville, the flamboyant Jeb, crimson cape, plumed hat, and all, had taken his cavalry Division on a broad circuit of the Union Army. Though Stuart had a perfect idea of Union dispositions he had no way to communicate with Lee, whose 80.000-man army was feeling its way toward Gettysburg in the midst of hostile enemy territory with no idea that the Union was moving northward at an impressive speed. In the meantime, Stuart was unnecessarily reprising his vaunted encirclement of McClellan during the Peninsular Campaign. On June 28^th, Stuart’s troop was within sight of the Washington Monument; on July 1^st, they were in Carlisle, Pennsylvania; though daring, the long ride accomplished nothing and cost very much.

As a result of Stuart’s absence, Lee had no way to know that Gettysburg had been occupied by Brigadier General John Buford's division of Federal cavalry on the evening of June 30^th.   

Despite orders not to engage, Confederate point troops ran afoul of Union cavalry overnight. The Confederates, in the early morning hours of July 1^st, sent the divisions of Major General Henry (Harry) Heth and Major General William Pender of A.P. Hill's Corps, down the Chambersburg Road to drive Buford away and occupy Gettysburg. Buford was outnumbered approximately four to one.

The battle began at 5:30 AM., when shots were exchanged over Marsh Creek. In the face of Buford's stiff resistance, General Heth pushed on cautiously until he reached a point about two miles west of Gettysburg. Here he deployed two brigades in line, and pressed ahead; Buford took heavy casualties but held the line with a judicious use of musketry and cannonade.

It was nearly 10 AM Federal General John F. Reynolds, commanding First Corps, arrived on the field at this point, and determined to engage with the Rebels. He ordered First Corps and Eleventh Corps to march to Gettysburg at double-time. Soon after 10:30 AM., First Corps arrived and swung into action along McPherson's Ridge.

It was sometime in mid-morning when Lee was alerted to action in his front by the rolling thunder of cannon and the crackle of rifleshot. By 11:30 AM, Harry Heth had been defeated and was forced to withdraw to Herr Ridge.

Early in the action, General Reynolds was killed. The man whom some described as “the best soldier in the army,” the former Commandant of West Point, and who had been President Lincoln’s first choice for overall command at Gettysburg had been shot from the saddle.  Field command devolved upon Howard with Eleventh Corps, who placed General Abner Doubleday in command of First Corps. 

 

A lull now settled over the field as both sides brought up reinforcements. The Federal First Corps deployed to defend the western approaches to Gettysburg, while Eleventh Corps formed up north of the town. Buford's cavalry covered the flanks. Howard left one division in reserve on Cemetery Hill. His strategy was simple: Delay the Confederates long enough to allow the rest of the Federal army to concentrate.

Lee arrived on the field after noon. He had initially hoped to avoid a general engagement since the strength of the enemy was unknown, and the terrain in the Gettysburg area was completely unfamiliar. Lee, however, decided to press a full frontal assault in the area.  

This decision has flummoxed historians for 150 years. Lee, a combat engineer, and an exceptional commander, expert in reading terrain, failed to recognize that the attack would be a disaster. The rolling hills of the area hid much from his eyes; the sight lines at Gettysburg guaranteed that Lee couldn’t see the Union troops massing in clear sight of open terrain.  As the battle developed, Lee simply did not have a clear view of Union maneuvers.

Soon after noon, Rodes's division of Ewell's Corps arrived on Oak Hill and attacked the right of First Corps in force. At 2:00 PM Heth's division joined the attack on First Corps. At 3:00 PM, the battle spread north of the town when Jubal Early's Division attacked down the Harrisburg Road and crushed the flank of Eleventh Corps. At about the same time, west of Gettysburg, First Corps' position along Seminary Ridge was heavily attacked. Pressed on all sides, First Corps gave way.

By 4:00 PM., First and Eleventh Corps were both chased in retreat through the town of Gettysburg, which was occupied by Lee’s army. The Union occupied Cemetery Hill.

Lee ordered Confederate General R.S. Ewell to seize the high ground from the battle-weary Federals "if practicable." Although the ridges in question were unoccupied but for Union signalmen, Ewell failed to move, thereby giving the Union troops time to dig in along Cemetery Ridge and bring in reinforcements with artillery. By the time Lee realized that Ewell had not attacked, the opportunity had been lost.

Union losses on the first day of Gettysburg are estimated to have been 950 killed and 4,550 wounded. The fighting of the first day has often been underrated by historians, as if it were merely a prelude to the mightier contest of the following two days. In fact, July 1, 1863 at Gettysburg was one of the fiercest battles of the war. For the Federals, the ordeal of the First Corps was terrible, especially in view of the high ratio of casualties to the number engaged. No fewer than 3,500 soldiers from that Corps were killed or wounded, which amounted to nearly 40% of those who actually fought that day, and this, it must be remembered, was in addition to more than 3,000 who were taken prisoner. And, it must also be remembered that most of the wounded were rendered permanently hors de combat, and that many of the wounded died following the battle and are not counted among those who died on the field.

Much the same can be said for Confederate losses on the first day, which are less well documented, but are considered to stand at 900 killed and 4,350 wounded in addition to 1,000 captured. As brutal as the bloodletting of First Corps was, First Corps virtually destroyed several Confederate brigades with casualty rates of 50-plus percent.

While the day's action had resulted in a significant Confederate tactical victory, it was a disastrous Confederate strategic loss. While the Confederates held Gettysburg proper, Federal forces had taken the high ground south of Gettysburg, where their position was soon strengthened by overnight reinforcements.