MARCH 28, 1865:
Having
received approval from President Lincoln for his Spring Offensive, General
Ulysses S. Grant issues orders to his various subcommanders.
Grant’s plan is relatively
straightforward. He plans to use unbearable pressure to push The Army of
Northern Virginia out of the Richmond-Petersburg pocket. At the same time, he
intends to cut the Boydton Plank Road and the Southside Railroad, the two last
supply lines into the pocket. If this maneuver is successful Petersburg, then
Richmond, will fall. Grant is counting on the fact that Robert E. Lee will
fight to keep his supply lines open. If Lee can be severely mauled in that
fight he may have no choice but to surrender. The war could be over by April
first.
Maybe . . .
Grant knows that Lee will not go down
without a fight, and a bitter one. So Grant has appointed Philip Sheridan to
lead the assault against Lee’s supply lines. He is confident that Sheridan will
triumph. By the Union clock it is two minutes to midnight for the Confederacy,
and Grant wants that bell to toll at the precisely correct moment.
Grant knows, however, that there are
alternate scenarios, all of which could ---
“. . . lead to a negotiated peace
with the Confederacy.”:
First, Lee could refuse to leave the
pocket. Grant is privately a little surprised that Lee has tried only once, at
Fort Stedman. This tells him that the Army of Northern Virginia might be more
debilitated than Grant realizes. It may also indicate a total unwillingness to
abandon Richmond. Grant knows that this could mean that The Army of The Potomac
might have to go into the pocket to clean it out. It is not an alternative
Grant relishes. The Confederates know their maze of entrenchments as well as
the rats who share them, and Grant’s men, no matter how numerically superior,
will be at a complete disadvantage in that enemy warren. Union casualties could
be --- no, will be --- frightful, win
or lose. Grant does not want to fight Lee in a static position again. The name
“Cold Harbor” rings like a tocsin in Grant’s brain. Union morale would
collapse, and . . .
Second, Lee could avoid battle and slip
out of the pocket altogether via one or either of his supply lines or some
other route. Were he to do so, it would appear that he had outfoxed Grant, and
this could mean a prolongation of the war. Grant fears just this: “I was afraid every morning that I would
wake from my sleep to hear that Lee had gone, and that nothing was left but his
picket line,” and . . .
Third, Lee could defeat Sheridan in a
close contest, and escape the pocket. This could mean a prolongation of the
war, and . . .
In any of these scenarios, a victorious
Lee would have two options ---
The first option would be that Lee
would move southward and link up with General Joseph E. Johnston C.S.A.’s Army
of Tennessee in North Carolina. Their combined force would have at least 50,000
men (plus newly-armed slaves and those enheartened Confederate recruits who
would doubtless flock to their banners). While Lee’s enlarged army would still
be vastly outnumbered by Grant and Sherman (who combined have nearly 250,000
men), it would still be large enough to force a prolongation of the war, and .
. .
The second option would be for Lee to
move his smaller, more compact, and always speedy army directly east to the
Blue Ridge Mountains. Once there, Lee could divide his men into partisan units
and harry the Union indefinitely. This could mean a prolongation of the war,
and . . .
Grant puts his faith in Phil Sheridan.