MARCH 17, 1862:
Following the Battle of Bull Run (First Manassas)
Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston's army maintained its position around
Manassas Junction and Centreville through the fall of 1861 and winter of 1862,
largely unmolested by the Union except for raids and skirmishes.
The Union,
however, was not idle in the east. Major General George B. McClellan U.S.A.
used the colder months to undertake a vast reorganization of the Army of the
Potomac. The Lincoln Administration had urged McClellan to undertake a major
offensive operation against Johnston before winter closed in, but McClellan
balked, saying that his troops were unready, and warning the Lincoln
Administration that it could not absorb another chaotic Bull Run-type defeat.
President Lincoln acquiesced to McClellan’s opinion. The army stayed put.
Finally, in mid-December McClellan put forth a plan, “The Urbanna Plan,” for an offensive thrust beyond Johnston's flank with the assistance of the Navy. He decided to load his army onto transports, steam down the Potomac River into the Chesapeake Bay, and then follow its coast to the mouth of the Rappahannock River and up to Urbanna. At this landing on the Rappahannock's southern bank, McClellan would disembark. His army would be only 50 miles from Richmond and in the rear of the Confederates along the Manassas line.
The Union commander decided that implementing such a complex operation would require time, so he delayed until spring, continuing to drill his men in the meantime. McClellan, with his customary hubris, failed to advise President Lincoln, or indeed anyone in the Administration of the Urbanna Plan. Unaware of McClellan's plan, Lincoln lost patience with the General's seeming inactivity, and on January 27, peremptorily ordered all Union armies to advance, beginning on February 22. Since the Western Theater was already very active, the order was aimed squarely at McClellan, who upon receiving the message immediately went to see the Commander- in-Chief. After the President was briefed, he first objected to the Urbanna Plan but McClellan was persuasive. Lincoln reluctantly agreed to the plan.
McClellan did not move on February 22nd as ordered, and indeed showed no signs of offensive activity at all. But the long delay worked in the Confederates’ favor. Joseph E. Johnston heard about the Urbanna Plan from informants, and decided to throw McClellan off balance. On March 9, Johnston abandoned the Manassas line, moving toward the Rappahannock River. McClellan's Urbanna Plan was rendered useless. McClellan quickly adapted it to changing conditions.
On March 17, 1862, almost a full month beyond schedule, McClellan finally broke his army of 121,500 men out of their seemingly permanent winter camp near Washington, D.C. The men, their supplies, and armaments were on their way to Fortress Monroe on the York River in Virginia.
Fortress Monroe, the largest moat-encircled masonry fortification in North America, commanded the entrance to Hampton Roads. It was the only fort in the Upper South not to fall into Confederate hands during secession. In addition to this massive army, McClellan sent approximately 38,000 men to Washington to guard the capital, a number significantly less than the 55,000 his corps commanders recommended. McClellan claimed he needed the extra troops.
This maneuver constitutes McClellan’s first gambit in the Peninsula Campaign.
