JUNE 13, 1864:
After a refit, the U.S.S. KEARSARGE leaves Dover, England in the U.K. to hunt for the notorious C.S.S. ALABAMA.
Since July 29, 1862, the ALABAMA --- a Confederate ship that has never entered a Confederate port, having been built in Liverpool --- has been commerce raiding with impunity against Union merchant vessels (and an occasional U.S. Naval vessel) over three-quarters of the surface of the earth. In total, she took 65 prizes, including U.S.S. HATTERAS, and commissioned one progeny, C.S.S. TUSCALOOSA, that took two more.
Except for brief liberty calls, the ship has been at sea for two years. She is sea-battered, her rigging is loose, her hull is barnacled, and she has lost most of her fabled speed.
Captain Raphael Semmes brings her into the Port of Cherbourg for an overhaul on June 11th, but the French have not been welcoming. Semmes is attempting to negotiate for a drydock. He knows the KEARSARGE is not far away, and soon the Union ship will take up station just beyond the limits of French territorial waters waiting for her nemesis to put out to sea again.
In Virginia, Robert E. Lee receives Intelligence that Ulysses S. Grant is bypassing Richmond to invest Petersburg. Lee knows that if Petersburg, Richmond’s supply depot, rail hub, and link to the rest of the Confederacy falls, the war will be as good as over. Lee hurriedly orders 2,300 men --- all he can muster in a hurry --- to ride for Petersburg and occupy the defensive works there that ring the city. Knowing that 2,300 men can be overrun by the massive Army of The Potomac in an eyeblink, Lee engages in a little disinformation and psyops campaign. He arranges for several slaves to be allowed to escape their masters each carrying the news that there are 10,000 men in the Petersburg revetments. Although it is not known for a certainty that the slaves knew the information was false, given the attitude of most southerners toward blacks and the mistrust they felt, it’s likely that the escaped slaves were unaware that the information was false.
Ares the God of War smiles on Lee when the first Union Commander to reach Petersburg is William “Baldy” Smith, the same General that risked a court-martial in refusing Grant’s orders to renew the attack on Cold Harbor’s earthworks. Once Smith views the Petersburg defenses and hears the slaves’ reports, he decides to do what Grant had done initially at Cold Harbor --- wait for reinforcements. Although this seems wise, the delay prolongs the war for months. The first prong of Grant’s planned three-pronged encirclement of Petersburg is dulled.
In western Virginia, Philip Sheridan rides away from Trevilian Station, hoping to link up with Union forces in the Shenandoah Valley. The last word from the commander there, General David Hunter, is that he has taken Lexington, Virginia and burned the Virginia Military Institute to the ground the day before. After destroying the hallowed site, Hunter is engaged by Confederate cavalry, Mosby’s Rangers, and irregulars. Although Hunter’s force numbers almost 20,000 he decides to retreat west toward friendly territory in West Virginia, rather than moving east toward his expected rendezvous with Sheridan. The second prong of Grant’s planned three-pronged encirclement of Petersburg is broken.
In eastern Virginia, General Benjamin Butler U.S.A. moves toward a planned consolidation with Grant’s forces at a tepid pace. Any Confederate resistance causes him to stop, regather his forces, and creep forward again. By the time the linkage occurs, Lee’s men will be safely inside Petersburg. The third prong of Grant’s planned three-pronged encirclement of Petersburg is bent.
Had Grant’s subordinates moved with purpose, it is quite possible that The Army of Northern Virginia would have been encircled by midmonth, and that Grant could have forced a surrender --- and the effective end of the war --- by July 1st. However, among Lincoln’s generals, only Ulysses S. Grant is unawed by the legendary Virginian.
Many historians have commented on Lee’s seemingly amazing ability to outmaneuver The Army of The Potomac. The reasons are many, but relatively simple:
1. The Army of Northern Virginia was operating on shorter interior lines in friendly territory. Lee had the ability, when marching on Petersburg to move through Richmond. Grant and The Army of The Potomac were forced to operate on lengthier exterior lines, moving around and bypassing most crossroads.
2. The Army of The Potomac was forced to keep to the rivers and rail lines where they could maintain their ever more thinly stretched supply lines. On average, the Army of The Potomac had to march three times the distance as the Army of Northern Virginia in order to reach the same objectives.
3. The Army of Northern Virginia was half the size of the Army of The Potomac, with less gear, and hence able to break camp and move far more quickly than the larger force. Also, The Army of Northern Virginia was made up entirely of tried soldiery, many having fought in the ranks since 1861, and intimately familiar with on-the-march procedures. Muscle memory was an important if unrecognized element in Lee’s success. The Army of The Potomac had more, if not a lot of, less-experienced men in the summer of 1864, men who were less familiar with on-the-march procedures. General Grant, for example, filled the ranks with garrison soldiers from Washington in order to besiege Petersburg. Many of these men had never seen real combat or been in the field since the war began. Multiplied many times, the small lags caused by the uncertain actions of such troops created a fairly large distortion factor in moving the army.
In sum, Lee could move his forces four to five times faster than Grant, so even a multi-day delay in mobilizing his army meant that Lee could usually get where he was going far faster than Grant, as he consistently did during the Overland Campaign.
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