March 28, 1865---“. . . lead to a negotiated peace with the Confederacy.”

MARCH 28, 1865:     

Having received approval from President Lincoln for his Spring Offensive, General Ulysses S. Grant issues orders to his various subcommanders.

Grant’s plan is relatively straightforward. He plans to use unbearable pressure to push The Army of Northern Virginia out of the Richmond-Petersburg pocket. At the same time, he intends to cut the Boydton Plank Road and the Southside Railroad, the two last supply lines into the pocket. If this maneuver is successful Petersburg, then Richmond, will fall. Grant is counting on the fact that Robert E. Lee will fight to keep his supply lines open. If Lee can be severely mauled in that fight he may have no choice but to surrender. The war could be over by April first.

Maybe . . . 

Grant knows that Lee will not go down without a fight, and a bitter one. So Grant has appointed Philip Sheridan to lead the assault against Lee’s supply lines. He is confident that Sheridan will triumph. By the Union clock it is two minutes to midnight for the Confederacy, and Grant wants that bell to toll at the precisely correct moment.

Grant knows, however, that there are alternate scenarios, all of which could ---

“. . . lead to a negotiated peace with the Confederacy.”: 

First, Lee could refuse to leave the pocket. Grant is privately a little surprised that Lee has tried only once, at Fort Stedman. This tells him that the Army of Northern Virginia might be more debilitated than Grant realizes. It may also indicate a total unwillingness to abandon Richmond. Grant knows that this could mean that The Army of The Potomac might have to go into the pocket to clean it out. It is not an alternative Grant relishes. The Confederates know their maze of entrenchments as well as the rats who share them, and Grant’s men, no matter how numerically superior, will be at a complete disadvantage in that enemy warren. Union casualties could be --- no, will be --- frightful, win or lose. Grant does not want to fight Lee in a static position again. The name “Cold Harbor” rings like a tocsin in Grant’s brain. Union morale would collapse, and . . .  

Second, Lee could avoid battle and slip out of the pocket altogether via one or either of his supply lines or some other route. Were he to do so, it would appear that he had outfoxed Grant, and this could mean a prolongation of the war. Grant fears just this: “I was afraid every morning that I would wake from my sleep to hear that Lee had gone, and that nothing was left but his picket line,” and . . .   

Third, Lee could defeat Sheridan in a close contest, and escape the pocket. This could mean a prolongation of the war, and . . . 

In any of these scenarios, a victorious Lee would have two options ---

The first option would be that Lee would move southward and link up with General Joseph E. Johnston C.S.A.’s Army of Tennessee in North Carolina. Their combined force would have at least 50,000 men (plus newly-armed slaves and those enheartened Confederate recruits who would doubtless flock to their banners). While Lee’s enlarged army would still be vastly outnumbered by Grant and Sherman (who combined have nearly 250,000 men), it would still be large enough to force a prolongation of the war, and . . .

The second option would be for Lee to move his smaller, more compact, and always speedy army directly east to the Blue Ridge Mountains. Once there, Lee could divide his men into partisan units and harry the Union indefinitely. This could mean a prolongation of the war, and . . .

Grant puts his faith in Phil Sheridan.