NOVEMBER 7, 1863:
The Second Battle of Rappahannock Station, Virginia.
Now called Remington,
the town was the site of the only Confederate pontoon bridge across the
Rappahannock River in late 1863. The Eastern Theatre had been very quiet since
Gettysburg---Virginia had seen little more than picket fire, skirmishes, raids,
and only the smallest of what might be scaled as “battles.”
It had been too quiet for too long, and the Union Command was growing concerned that Marse Robert had something up his sleeve. They decided to act. Seizure of the bridge by the Union would cut the Army of Virginia off from being able to maneuver on the north bank of the river, hence halting any planned autumn offensive.
The Union plan was to take the bridge in a two-pronged attack---a direct assault at the bridge combined with a flanking move across Kelly’s Ford. Although the Union faced the stubborn Jubal Early as Confederate field commander for this action, both maneuvers were successful. Robert E. Lee was convinced that the flanking action at Kelly’s Ford was the main thrust; thus, he ordered Early to move the bulk of his troops to that area, leaving Early just enough men to check what Lee thought was the Union feint.
Lee had the battle plan precisely reversed in his head. The Kelly’s Ford feint tied up the bulk of Southern troops, while the Northerners took the bridge against determined but outnumbered resistance.
Confederate losses were alarmingly high---almost 1700 of the less than 2000 men involved were killed, wounded or captured (over 80%). Union losses numbered about 400 out of a force of 2000.
This relatively small, relatively minor battle broke Confederate resolve in the Eastern Theatre. Lee, who had indeed been planning an Autumn offensive, called it off, and withdrew behind the line of the Rapidan River in what his aide, Major Taylor called, “the saddest chapter in the history of [the Army of Northern Virginia].”
It had been too quiet for too long, and the Union Command was growing concerned that Marse Robert had something up his sleeve. They decided to act. Seizure of the bridge by the Union would cut the Army of Virginia off from being able to maneuver on the north bank of the river, hence halting any planned autumn offensive.
The Union plan was to take the bridge in a two-pronged attack---a direct assault at the bridge combined with a flanking move across Kelly’s Ford. Although the Union faced the stubborn Jubal Early as Confederate field commander for this action, both maneuvers were successful. Robert E. Lee was convinced that the flanking action at Kelly’s Ford was the main thrust; thus, he ordered Early to move the bulk of his troops to that area, leaving Early just enough men to check what Lee thought was the Union feint.
Lee had the battle plan precisely reversed in his head. The Kelly’s Ford feint tied up the bulk of Southern troops, while the Northerners took the bridge against determined but outnumbered resistance.
Confederate losses were alarmingly high---almost 1700 of the less than 2000 men involved were killed, wounded or captured (over 80%). Union losses numbered about 400 out of a force of 2000.
This relatively small, relatively minor battle broke Confederate resolve in the Eastern Theatre. Lee, who had indeed been planning an Autumn offensive, called it off, and withdrew behind the line of the Rapidan River in what his aide, Major Taylor called, “the saddest chapter in the history of [the Army of Northern Virginia].”
