Friday, June 14, 2013

March 20, 1862---"McClellan will never risk a defeat."



MARCH 20, 1862:      

Major General John Bankhead Magruder C.S.A. (sometimes called “Jeb” or “Prince John”) arrives on Virginia’s James Peninsula to take command of Confederate troops there. Magruder immediately sends a report to Robert E. Lee noting an increase in Federal troops at Fort Monroe and nearby Hampton, Virginia. He suggests using the C.S.S. VIRGINIA to interdict the transfer of Union troops to Fortress Monroe by sea. Magruder also offers a shrewd assessment of McClellan’s plans:

"I think McClellan has shown his plan is to turn flanks by great detours of land and water. The falling back of our army from the Potomac gives him the power to detach largely, and I think he will never risk a defeat himself when he can devolve the risk of it upon some one of his subordinates."


March 19, 1862---"A death-blow to the Rebellion."



MARCH 19, 1862:      

 General George B. McClellan issues the Press the text of an address he had given to his soldiers on the 17th, explaining that he had held them back so that they might give the death-blow to the Rebellion, and that the moment for action has now arrived.


March 18, 1862---A Jewish Secretary of State



MARCH 18, 1862:      

 Jefferson Davis shuffles cabinet positions in his Administration. Judah P. Benjamin, who had been criticized frequently for his handling of the War Department, became the Confederate Secretary of State (the criticism followed him to his new job, even though he performed brilliantly; the fact of the matter was that many Southerners were uncomfortable with a Jew in a position of such authority). George W. Randolph of Virginia took Benjamin’s old job. Ex-Secretary of State R. M. T. Hunter, departed for the Senate.


March 17, 1862---McClellan is on the move



MARCH 17, 1862:       

Following the Battle of Bull Run (First Manassas) Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston's army maintained its position around Manassas Junction and Centreville through the fall of 1861 and winter of 1862, largely unmolested by the Union except for raids and skirmishes. 

The Union, however, was not idle in the east. Major General George B. McClellan U.S.A. used the colder months to undertake a vast reorganization of the Army of the Potomac. The Lincoln Administration had urged McClellan to undertake a major offensive operation against Johnston before winter closed in, but McClellan balked, saying that his troops were unready, and warning the Lincoln Administration that it could not absorb another chaotic Bull Run-type defeat. President Lincoln acquiesced to McClellan’s opinion. The army stayed put. 


Finally, in mid-December McClellan put forth a plan, “The Urbanna Plan,” for an offensive thrust beyond Johnston's flank with the assistance of the Navy. He decided to load his army onto transports, steam down the Potomac River into the Chesapeake Bay, and then follow its coast to the mouth of the Rappahannock River and up to Urbanna. At this landing on the Rappahannock's southern bank, McClellan would disembark. His army would be only 50 miles from Richmond and in the rear of the Confederates along the Manassas line.

The Union commander decided that implementing such a complex operation would require time, so he delayed until spring, continuing to drill his men in the meantime. McClellan, with his customary hubris, failed to advise President Lincoln, or indeed anyone in the Administration of the Urbanna Plan. Unaware of McClellan's plan, Lincoln lost patience with the General's seeming inactivity, and on January 27, peremptorily ordered all Union armies to advance, beginning on February 22. Since the Western Theater was already very active, the order was aimed squarely at McClellan, who upon receiving the message immediately went to see the Commander- in-Chief. After the President was briefed, he first objected to the Urbanna Plan but McClellan was persuasive. Lincoln reluctantly agreed to the plan.

McClellan did not move on February 22nd as ordered, and indeed showed no signs of offensive activity at all. But the long delay worked in the Confederates’ favor. Joseph E. Johnston heard about the Urbanna Plan from informants, and decided to throw McClellan off balance. On March 9, Johnston abandoned the Manassas line, moving toward the Rappahannock River. McClellan's Urbanna Plan was rendered useless. McClellan quickly adapted it to changing conditions.

On March 17, 1862, almost a full month beyond schedule, McClellan finally broke his army of 121,500 men out of their seemingly permanent winter camp near Washington, D.C. The men, their supplies, and armaments were on their way to Fortress Monroe on the York River in Virginia. 

Fortress Monroe, the largest moat-encircled masonry fortification in North America, commanded the entrance to Hampton Roads. It was the only fort in the Upper South not to fall into Confederate hands during secession. In addition to this massive army, McClellan sent approximately 38,000 men to Washington to guard the capital, a number significantly less than the 55,000 his corps commanders recommended. McClellan claimed he needed the extra troops. 


This maneuver constitutes McClellan’s first gambit in the Peninsula Campaign.




March 16, 1862---The Skirmish at Pound Gap, KY



MARCH 16, 1862:      

 A brief but violent skirmish routs Rebels at Pound Gap, Kentucky.