September 20, 1864---The Battle of Fisher's Hill

SEPTEMBER 20, 1864:     

The Battle of Fisher’s Hill:    

Jubal Early’s bloodied force moves up the Valley --- south --- in order to escape Philip Sheridan’s pursuing forces. With only 8,000 effectives against Sheridan’s 30,000, Early knows he must find a defensible place to make a stand. That place is Fisher’s Hill near Strasburg. 

Fisher’s Hill is thought (by both sides) to be impregnable, but this is true only if held in force. Early needs to have enough troops to cover a four-mile front from Little North Mountain to Massanutten Mountain. Without adequate troops his flanks are exposed and susceptible to assault. And there’s the rub. After his losses at Third Winchester the day before, Early simply does not have enough men. A captain in the 13th Virginia succinctly described the Confederate dilemma, saying, ‘The position was a very strong one, but our army was too small to man it.’

Early decides to withdraw and move south again, but by the time he has his orders up, Sheridan has invested Fisher’s Hill. Sheridan dislikes the standard Civil War maneuver of frontal assault, and decides instead to flank Early. This decision is strictly serendipitous. Sheridan does not yet know of Early’s weakness on the flanks. Sheridan orders General George Crook --- who had briefly commanded all Union forces in the Valley, and who many argue was the creator of Sheridan’s assault plan this day  --- to make the maneuver with his seasoned Valley troops. 

 

Crook’s Divisions move left into a position which is completely empty of Confederates. As soon as Crook’s men are in position, they break through the weak Confederate left flank. The Confederate pickets run. As Crook advances, Union troops on the right flank move up over the hill.  

Panic ensues among the Southerners who are expecting a frontal assault. Confederate soldiers abandon their lines, including mounted cavalry. Early later blasts the fleeing horsemen as the “authors of all my disasters,” blaming them for the loss at Fisher’s Hill.  

With everything in chaos, Early orders his scattering troops to leave Fisher’s Hill and head  further south --- up the Valley. Hus ultimate goal now is to link up with Lee’s forces near Richmond.

Deaths are minimal at Fisher’s Hill. Early has 30 men killed; he, however loses more than 1,000 who are taken prisoner. Union losses are 50 killed, and about 600 wounded.

After Fisher’s Hill, Sheridan elects to pursue Early up the Valley, but Early’s men go to ground among the friendly Rebel civilian population, living to fight another day.

Still, Sheridan has reason to be pleased. Not only has he taken most of the lower Valley back after years of Union frustration, but he has reduced Early’s force to less than 7,000 (temporarily at least) disorganized men.

September 19, 1864---The Battle of Opequon (Third Winchester)

SEPTEMBER 19, 1864:  

 

The Battle of Opequon (The Third Battle of Winchester, Virginia; Third Winchester). Ulysses S. Grant had been handling the Shenandoah Valley with kid gloves all Spring and Summer long. The Valley had been a problem for the Union throughout the war. Intensely Confederate, and the breadbasket of Virginia, the leaders of the Confederacy had every reason to defend the Valley to the last.

 

The Valley also served as America’s first real interstate highway. Its broad level roads allowed Confederate troops to move up (southward) and down (northward) the Valley with great speed, managing to place troops wherever they were needed to counter any Union threats. Stonewall Jackson’s Valley Campaign of 1861-1862 had dealt the Union harsh blows and had confirmed that the Valley’s soil was utterly Rebel gray. 

Jackson was dead and gone, and now so was his protégé, Jeb Stuart. The task of defending the Valley had passed to Jubal Early, and although “Old Jube” lacked the charisma and dash of Jackson, Stuart, Mosby, Morgan, Forrest, or even Robert E. Lee, he had proven himself to be an extremely able leader who, using the Valley as his route, had brought the war to the enemy at Frederick, Maryland (which he’d held for ransom), Chambersburg, Pennsylvania (which he’d burned), and even Washington D.C. (where his troopers had gotten a shot off at President Lincoln). Early had chased General David Hunter U.S.A. all the way out of the Valley, west almost to Ohio. 

 

 

In frustration and in hope, Grant had assigned Philip Sheridan to police up Jubal Early’s forces, the only contingent of the Army of Northern Virginia not penned up in Richmond and Petersburg.  Sheridan had moved against Early in Winchester on August 10^th driving him from the town, and on August 16^th Sheridan’s men gave Early’s men a very bloody nose at Guard Hill.

After Guard Hill, Grant had counseled patience to Sheridan. Although it was uncharacteristic of Grant to order anyone to hold back in battle, Grant had advised Sheridan not to engage Early unless Sheridan had a clear advantage on the field. 

 

There were good reasons to hold back.  First of all, Grant knew that  Sheridan was his last and best cork for keeping Early bottled up in the Valley.  He did not  want Sheridan’s force  to  suffer  losses  that  might give Early an  upper  hand.

Secondly, Grant knew that if Early were to get an upper hand he would ride back to Washington just to show that he could. Though Early could never actually take the city, the resulting blow to  Union morale might prove fatal. The Confederate armies around Atlanta and Richmond-Petersburg might find the strength to break out of the pockets the Union had consigned them to. A string of Confederate victories would create a whole new scenario for the war. President Lincoln would certainly lose the November election and the Peace Democrats and Copperheads would be dictating policy come March. 1865 --- and that policy would include recognition of the Confederacy. 

 

Better then, in the dark summer of Union despair, not to risk letting the genie out of the bottle. Sheridan therefore limited himself to small-scale picket raids and skirmishes, doing even less than Grant expected.

 

 

After meeting with Grant on the 16^th, Sheridan clearly felt that the fetters had been struck off. The devastating collapse of Confederate morale in the shadow of the loss of Atlanta could not be counterbalanced by anything Early might do in the Valley; the scale of that defeat had rendered Early an  impotent linchpin in any Confederate resurgence. Yes, there were risks but Early’s defeat would be another body blow to the Confederacy.  So Sheridan moved against him. Early, who had his forces spread out to block any attempted Union advance up the Valley, was horrified to discover that Sheridan was moving his main force toward Winchester. The many-times fought over and burned town was now little more than a wide spot in the road, but since it controlled the Valley Pike it was critical that Early hold it. Early  put out a muster order, and his troops arrived at Winchester literally moments before Sheridan’s horsemen thundered into town.

 

Early had the luck; Sheridan came from the east, along a narrow country road. His troops were strung out in a long line, and as a result Early had time to see to the disposition of his troops, which were well organized by the time Sheridan moved against them. 

 

The Union 6^th and 19^th Corps went against Early’s front, but the lay of the land left a gap between them, a gap Early’s men rushed to fill. The Union forces attacked on the flanks. Bloody, close-range fighting broke out, and despite heavy Union casualties, the weight of numbers began to tell. Although Opequon Creek was shaping up into a Union victory, Sheridan had decided not to disengage until he had not only beaten but also decimated and demoralized Early men. Sheridan threw the 8^th Corps into the battle. While the Union troops of the 6^th and 19^th were engaging Early’s men in the gap, the 8^th divided, and attacked the Confederates on the outer flanks of their positions. 

 

The Confederate line broke; Early’s forces began to withdraw battered bloody, but in order. Sheridan then ordered two divisions of Union cavalry against the flanks. The left flank of the Confederate main body collapsed. It is said that Sheridan was so excited at the outcome that he rode Rienzi up and down the line shouting encouragement to his men and waving his hat. 

 

 

 Many officers were killed or wounded during the Battle of Opequon. In the Union army, Brigadier General David A. Russell was killed, and Brigadier Generals Emory Upton, George H. Chapman, and John B. McIntosh were seriously wounded. Confederate Major General Robert E. Rodes was killed and Major General Fitzhugh Lee, Brigadier Generals William Terry, Archibald Godwin, and Col. William Wharton were all wounded. Also among the Confederate dead was Colonel George S. Patton, Sr. His grandson and namesake would become the famous U.S. general of World War II, George S. Patton, Jr.

In total, Confederate losses were 3,600 of 12,000, a third of Early’s force. Union losses were 5,000 of 35,000, about a seventh of Sheridan’s force.