Thursday, March 12, 2015

March 14, 1865---"A Hebrew Purim Ball"



MARCH 14, 1865:     

Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper covers “A Hebrew Purim Ball” held at the New York Academy of Music (located at E. 14th St. and Irving Place) on this day. Funds raised are donated to the Union cause.


Philip Sheridan occupies the Richmond suburb of Columbia, putting Richmond in direct danger of assault. As part of his movements, Sheridan does great damage to the telegraph lines and post roads and canals in the greater Richmond region. The destruction is slowed only by bad weather and worse roads. Still, Lee cannot help but recognize the signs that the Union is gearing up for a Spring Offensive.  Lee issues an Order for a General Amnesty, inviting all deserters back into the lines. Numbers of men slowly begin straggling back.


March 13, 1865---The Negro Soldier Act



MARCH 13, 1865:     

After months of vituperative wrangling, the Confederate Congress passes The Negro Soldier Act authorizing the induction of slaves as combat soldiers into the Confederate armies: 

The Myth of the Black Confederate is of relatively recent vintage
AN ACT to increase the military force of the Confederate States.

The Congress of the Confederate States of America do enact, 

SEC 1. That, in order to provide additional forces to repel invasion, maintain the rightful possession of the Confederate States, secure their independence, and preserve their institutions, the President be, and he is hereby, authorized to ask for and accept from the owners of slaves, the services of such number of able-bodied negro men as he may deem expedient, for and during the war, to perform military service in whatever capacity he may direct.

SEC 2. That the General-in-Chief be authorized to organize the said slaves into companies, battalions, regiments, and brigades, under such rules and regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe, and to be commanded by such officers as the President may appoint.

SEC 3. That while employed in the service the said troops shall receive the same rations, clothing, and compensation as are allowed to other troops in the same branch of the service.

SEC 4. That if, under the previous sections of this act, the President shall not be able to raise a sufficient number of troops to prosecute the war successfully and maintain the sovereignty of the States and the independence of the Confederate States, then he is hereby authorized to call on each State, whenever he thinks it expedient, for her quota of 300,000 troops, in addition to those subject to military service under existing laws, or so many thereof as the President may deem necessary to be raised from such classes of the population, irrespective of color, in each State, as the proper authorities thereof may determine: 

Provided, 

That not more than twenty-five per cent. of the male slaves between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, in any State, shall be called for under the provisions of this act.

SEC 5. That nothing in this act shall be construed to authorize a change in the relation which the said slaves shall bear toward their owners, except by consent of the owners and of the States in which they may reside, and in pursuance of the laws thereof.

Approved March 13, 1865.

African-American Confederates taking the Oath of Allegiance, March 1865
This is not the law that Robert E. Lee wanted or Jefferson Davis wanted. They wanted emancipation as a concomitant of faithful service under arms, but in the end, the Confederate Congress failed to meet the challenge. This is not, as Confederate apologists and revisionists would make it, “a Confederate Emancipation Proclamation.” Nor is it, as some more responsible historians have said, “understood” anywhere in the law that manumission of the fighting slave was implied. If anything, Section 5 of the law should put paid to such illusions. The Confederate leadership did not, in the end, as some have written, choose their own freedom over the bondage of their slaves. 

Yet, the myth of “Confederate Emancipation,” though recent, has taken on a life of its own. There are those who discuss the existence of thousands of slaves as soldiers under Confederate service during the war. There are those who claim the existence of “negro” combat units. There are documented sightings of negro “soldiers” manning cannons. There are those who state that “thousands” of blacks were put under arms by the Negro Soldier Act. 

All of these assertions are distortions of truths:

A photo, often used by Confederate revisionists to "prove" the existence of African-American combat troops in the Confederacy.

However, the original uncropped photo clearly shows the unit under the command of a white  Union officer.
In 1861 at the outset of the Civil War, a group of freeborn New Orleans blacks, some of whom were slaveholders (and at least one of whom was a dark-skinned Moroccan Jew by the name of Moses Carvalho who had been denied enlistment in the Confederate army), formed their own fighting unit, the Louisiana Native Guards, sometimes called the Corps d’Afrique. The Corps d’Afrique did indeed fight for the Southern cause until objections from other Confederate units led the Confederate Congress to inform the Native Guards that their services were no longer needed. Rather than disbanding, the Corps d’Afrique crossed the battle line en masse on September 27, 1862, becoming a unit in the Union Army. So ended the history of the only black Confederate combat unit to see action before April 1865.  

Likewise in 1861, Frederick Douglass, the former slave and Emancipationist, argued that blacks should be permitted to fight for the Union. He argued,

It is now pretty well established, that there are at the present moment many colored men in the Confederate army doing duty not only as cooks, servants and laborers, but as real soldiers, having muskets on their shoulders, and bullets in their pockets, ready to shoot down loyal troops. 

Douglass, of course, spent the war years in the North; had he gotten close enough to combat to see for himself the truth of the existence of fighting black Confederates he would have likely been killed or captured and returned to slavery. He had no doubt heard of the Louisiana Native Guards, and these very men may have been the “many” with “bullets in their pockets” to which he referred. Douglass’ published comments were designed for a Northern audience, a goad to the North to push for the creation of black combat units, the United States Colored Troops. In this, he was successful. In perpetuating the self-congratulatory myths of white supremacists, he would have undoubtedly been satisfied to be less so. 

There were in fact many thousands of Southern black men in combat zones. They were slaves, not soldiers. In the Confederate Army it was not at all unusual for officers and men to bring along a slave or two to act as body servants, doing the mundane tasks of darning their masters’ socks, polishing their boots, perhaps cooking a meal, or drawing a bath. Slaves were also purchased by the government or by the army, or were appropriated as need be, in emergencies. All blacks were routinely assigned to heavy labor details, digging ditches and trenches, unloading boxcars and wagons and caissons, pushing batteries into position, and loading cannons with powder and shell. They distributed supplies, and took over the customary roles of “support troops,” allowing more whites to bear arms. They routinely came under Union fire. There is no record of how many of these men died in service to the Confederacy. 

A young Confederate officer and his "servant." Note that the slave is unarmed.
To call these men “soldiers” is to give undeserved credence to the policies of the South, to ironically, paper over the backbreaking effort with which these slaves served an unthankful Master. These men, enforced into service, were not soldiers. They had no rank, and they were not members of the army. In the eyes of the Confederacy, despite their bravery and effort they had essentially the same status as draught animals. 

Master Andrew and "servant" Silas Chandler posed for this photograph in a studio. Despite the quasi-uniform which some slaveowners provided as an affectation, African-Americans were not legally permitted to serve in combat roles in the C.S.A. until March 25, 1865, when the Negro Soldier Act took effect. The gun and combat knife on Silas' person were certainly unloaded and dull, and belonged to Andrew, who could have been arrested or even hanged for providing weapons to Silas.
Given that there was large available black population slaving (literally) beside white fighting men, it would appear to have been logical to allow black men to bear arms long before March 1865. But historically, blacks were legally forbidden to carry any weapons at all (even tools were routinely locked away when not in immediate use). Arming blacks was a hanging offense, as John Brown had discovered in 1859. Only in deep rural Florida and on the Texas frontier could slaves carry rifles for hunting and for protection. Had a slave at Gettysburg or Antietam picked up a gun even to defend his master, he would likely have been in just as much danger from Johnny Reb as from Billy Yank.

More "proof" of black military units in the C.S.A., this sketch is of the U.S. Corps d'Afrique in 1863 honoring a fallen comrade  
Given the vast sweep and complexity (and weirdness, it must be admitted) of the Civil War, it would be foolish to state that no Southern black anywhere at any time ever hefted a rifle for self-defense, for defense of his family, for defense of his owners (if he was a slave) or in defense of what was, after all, for better or worse, the only homeland he knew. But that is a far cry from claiming that there were standing and officially-sanctioned Confederate black combat units.  The white South’s blind adherence to its traditions and to its peculiar institution forbade even bolstering its army of independence with black strength.

Slaves worked as stevedores and heavy laborers in combat zones. After the Negro Soldier Act took effect, a score of African-American soldiers evacuated Richmond with Robert E. Lee. By the time the A.N.V. reached Amelia Court House, only one man, the unit's color sergeant, was still in the ranks. The rest had fled across Union lines
In the event, Lee and Davis both took steps that their Congress would not take --- but they still stopped short: 

Lee issued a General Orders that stated that “no slave may be taken into combat service against his own will” (though in practice this would have required a slave to challenge his owner’s decisions at the risk of punishment). Lee added that fighting slaves, “shall be afforded, as far as possible, the rights of free men”; that squirrelly phrase, “as far as possible” was a breeding ground of sins.  

Davis issued an Executive Order stating that all black men who served “honorably” shall be “subject to eventual manumission,” though Davis’ eventuality would have undoubtedly come only “with all deliberate speed.”

At all rates, the Negro Soldier Law made no difference to the war effort once it became effective on the 25th of March.  The Union had already chewed through the South, tearing great rents in its territory and social fabric. Millions of slaves had already been freed by Proclamation and by military action. Others ran away. An unknown number were beyond the reach of Confederate legislation, isolated with their owners in pockets of Confederate resistance and receiving no news from Richmond. Delay spelled doom. It was too late for the South.

The Negro Soldier Law, which may have well swelled Confederate ranks by the hundreds of thousands had it been passed in the Fall of 1864, barely raised a full regiment of men in the Spring of 1865. 

The Congress in Richmond successfully accomplished just one thing in its short history: In its bloviating intransigence, it talked the Confederacy to death.



Tuesday, March 10, 2015

March 12, 1865---"Keep everybody busy . . ."

MARCH 12, 1865:      

General William Tecumseh Sherman writes to his boss, Ulysses S. Grant, to discuss the wind-up of the Carolinas Campaign. The letter appears below (in part).  Sherman is in fine fettle as he writes:


DEAR GENERAL: 


We reached this place yesterday at noon; [C.S. General] Hardee, as usual, [is] retreating across the Cape Fear, burning his bridges; but our pontoons will be up to-day, and, with as little delay as possible, I will be after him toward Goldsboro. A tug has just come up from Wilmington, and before I get off from here, I hope to get from Wilmington some shoes and stockings, sugar, coffee, and flour. We are abundantly supplied with all else . . . The army is in splendid health, condition, and spirits, though we have had foul weather, and roads that would have stopped travel to almost any other body of men I ever heard of.


Our march was substantially what I designed --- straight on Columbia. We destroyed . . . the railroad[s] . . . to Aiken . . .  [to] Orangeburg . . .  to Kingsville and [to] Charlotte . . . At Columbia we destroyed immense arsenals [,] railroad establishments, [and] forty-three cannon. At Cheraw we found also machinery and material of war . . . twenty-five guns and thirty-six hundred barrels of powder; and here [in Fayetteville] we find about twenty guns and a magnificent United States' arsenal.


We cannot afford to leave detachments, and I shall therefore destroy this valuable arsenal, so the enemy shall not have its use; and the United States should never again confide such valuable property to a people who have betrayed a trust.


I could leave here to-morrow, but [a] vast crowd of refugees and negroes encumber[s] us . . . I will send [them] down to Wilmington . . .  


I hope you have not been uneasy about us . . . this march . . . had to be made . . . to destroy the valuable depots by the way, [for] the necessary fall of Charleston, [and] Georgetown, and Wilmington. If I can now add Goldsboro without too much cost, I will be in a position to aid you materially in the spring campaign. Jos. Johnston may try to . . . concentrate his scattered armies at Raleigh, and I will go straight at him . . . 
 

 . . . Keep everybody busy . . . 




At the same time that Grant and Sherman are keeping everybody busy, so are Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis. Lee has been keeping a close eye on developments since the beginning of the month. Everywhere he looks, the Confederacy is contracting its borders, its towns and cities falling like dominoes. Having settled on a plan for his Spring Offensive, during the last two weeks he has been meeting regularly with his President to discuss the evacuation of Richmond. Lee knows that he cannot both hold the city and mount an effective, mobile, offensive. 


Conditions in the city are beyond dire: When available, flour is selling for $1,500.00 a barrel in the now nearly worthless Confederate currency, low quality beef for $12.00-$15.00 a pound, butter for $20 a pound, and boots for $500 a pair. “[These are] close times in this beleaguered city,”  writes one Confederate lady. “You can carry your money in your market basket and bring home your provisions in your purse.”


And that is when foodstuffs are available. People are subsisting mainly on cornbread soaked in bacon drippings, dried beans, and hot water with salt or brown sugar sprinkled on it, a barely palatable fare known as 'Benjamin hardtack' in honor of former Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin. Cats, dogs, mice and rats and squirrels are also on the menu. 


A businessman from outside Richmond visited the city in this March, and wrote, “Everyone wore a haggard, scared look as if in apprehension of some great impending calamity.  I dared not ask a question, nor had I need to do so, as I felt too surely that the end was near. My first visit was to my banker . . .  As soon as he could give me a private moment he said in a sad, low tone: 'If you have any paper money put it into specie at once.’" 


The exact date is not known, but sometime around the middle of March, Lee and Davis decide that Richmond must be given up as soon as is possible. Plans are made to move the Confederate government to the small Virginia town of Danville, which lies on the northern border of North Carolina, securely between Lee’s lines and Johnston’s. General Orders are drafted that all Confederate offices are to archive their files and burn whatever is unneeded. Secret orders are drafted, specifying that a special train is to be outfitted to carry the Confederate Archives, the Cabinet, the President, and willing members of Congress away to safety. Davis in his Spartan manner demurs from having a personal railcar --- he and his family can sit on benches like any regular passengers --- but a car is outfitted as his office.


“Why not go immediately?”  Davis wants to know.


Lee explains that the weather is still too rotten and that the roads are too muddy for either the evacuation or for the onset of his Offensive. He adds, in a low tone, that his horses are too weak to pull the caissons through mud. Davis does not ask about the troops. He does not have to. But Lee assures him that their fighting spirit burns as brightly as ever, and this is what he is counting on. And there is one option that may save the capital city, Lee opines.


The gaunt Confederate President gives his General-in-Chief his full attention. Lee explains that at the extreme southern end of the Confederate entrenchments the Union and Confederate lines are within only a few hundred feet of each other. Since Christmas, when the Billy Yanks brought holiday cheer across the lines to the Johnny Rebs, the men in that area have become friendly. He feels that the Union boys are off their guard. 


Lee is heavy-hearted at the thought of more killing. Throughout the war he has avoided calling the men in blue The Enemy, opting instead for Those People, as opposed to These People, his own Confederates. And he is about to take advantage of the good-hearted weakness of Those People.  But there is nothing for it but to punch through the line there and send troops down the Appomattox River forcing open a corridor to Johnston’s army; the combined forces of Lee and Johnston can then fall on Grant from two directions. 


Davis assents, with the proviso that Lee must immediately inform him, no matter the time of day, if and when the holding of the Confederate capital becomes untenable. Lee agrees, setting the onset of his Offensive for the end of the month.  The men shake hands and take their leave of one another. Lee returns to his Petersburg headquarters at Edge Hill. During the long ride from Richmond, Lee has time to reflect.  Perhaps it is then that the inevitability of defeat strikes Robert E. Lee.


Upon reaching his HQ he eats a quick meal, and then discusses events with his Military Aide, his son Custis:


“Well, Mr. Custis, I have been up to see The Congress and they do not seem to be able to do anything except to eat peanuts and chew tobacco, while my army is starving. I told them the condition the men were in, and that something must be done at once, but I can't get them to do anything, or they are unable to do anything . . . Mister Custis, when this war began, I was opposed to it, bitterly opposed to it, and I told these people that, unless every man should do his whole duty, they would repent it; and now --- they will repent.”




 




Monday, March 9, 2015

March 11, 1865---The Fall of Fayetteville, North Carolina



MARCH 11, 1865:     


The Fall of Fayetteville, North Carolina: Despite William Tecumseh Sherman’s Order of March 7thto prevent any wanton destruction of property, or any unkind treatment of citizens" in North Carolina, today he issues very different Orders regarding the fate of the staunchly Confederate city of Fayetteville: 

Fayetteville's Market House was built in 1832. Located in the geographic center of the old town, merchants and hawkers used the open first floor to ply their wares on market days (usually Wednesdays), Municipal offices were upstairs.  Although damaged in the Civil War the landmark building was restored.
Special Field Orders No. 28.
HDQRS. Mil. Div. of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Fayetteville, N.C.,

March 11, 1865.

I.   The Right Wing, Maj. Gen. O. O. Howard commanding, will cross Cape Fear River as soon as possible and take roads leading toward Faison’s Station, on the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad, but will not depart from the river until further notice.

II.  The Left Wing, Maj. Gen. H. W. Slocum commanding, will hold the town of Fayetteville, and he will lay his pontoons ready to cross the river, but in the meantime will destroy all railroad property, all shops, factories, tanneries, &c., and all mills, save one water-mill of sufficient capacity to grind meal for the people of Fayetteville.

III.  The cavalry is charged with destroying the railroad trestles, depots, mills, and factories as far up as lower Little River, including its bridge, and will be prepared to cross to the east of Cape Fear River during Monday night.

IV.  Bvt. Col. O. M. Poe is charged with the utter demolition of the arsenal building and everything pertaining to it, and Bvt. Lieut. Col. T.G. Baylor, chief ordnance officer, is charged with the destruction of all powder, and ordnance stores, including guns and small-arms, keeping the usual record.  The time allowed will be Sunday and Monday.

V.  All commanding officers having refugee families or negroes in charge will prepare a train with a small guard to proceed to Wilmington,; after crossing South River an officer will be detailed from these headquarters to conduct them to Wilmington.  A guard of 100 men of each will composed of men entitled to discharge or escaped soldiers and officers will be deemed a sufficient guard

VI.  The army will prepare to lean toward the northeast by Tuesday next.

By order of Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman:

L.M. Dayton,
Assistant Adjutant- General


Sherman is surprised at the resistance he is finding in supposedly “Unionist” North Carolina. To date, Confederate forces have engaged his more aggressively and effectively than in “Secesh” South Carolina, and despite his initial intentions, Sherman feels it is time to inflict a lesson on the State. As his men march into Fayetteville, the commercial centers of the town and the Fayetteville Arsenal are set alight.


But there are Unionists in Fayetteville, and they are not unhappy about Sherman’s change of plans, The Editor of the underground newspaper Fayetteville Herald of The Union, newly emerging into the light, pens a short piece entitled “Sherman, The Raider”:

It is usual for those who set about the conquest of a country to act upon the miser’s rules. “Get all you can, and keep all you get.” Hence, they endeavor to secure their acquisitions as they go, and to make each the basis of the next. 

Sherman acts upon a different rule. He is simply a great raider. He is conducting a novel military experiment and is testing the problem, whether or not a great country can be conquered by raids.

Results, so far have gained him some reputation for success in making his transits and consequently exhibit the theory on which he is operating under most favorable conditions.


During the Civil War, nearly one-third of Fayetteville’s men of age fought for the Confederacy (and approximately that number fought for the Union or stayed “neutral” as long as they could). It was, during the war, definitely a Confederate city. There was a Unionist presence, but it remained subdued. The town’s resources fed the Southern war machine exclusively --- Fayetteville’s munitions factories (staffed entirely by women) turned out 900,000 bullets for The Army of Northern Virginia in 1864 alone.

And today, as Sherman’s men march in, Wade Hampton C.S.A. daringly does not march out. A skirmish takes place down in the rail yards. About a dozen Billy Yanks are killed before overwhelming numbers force Hampton and his men to flee Fayetteville. 

Antebellum Sandford House in Fayetteville's Heritage Square is today used for special functions such as conferences and weddings. Battle damage from the Civil War is still visible within the house. During World War II, the house served as a residence for young unmarried women working in Fayetteville's war industries
 
In Raleigh, the Confederate Governor, Zebulon Vance, castigates Sherman for going back on his Orders of March 7th, advising his constituents that Sherman is dishonorable and that it has never been Sherman’s plan to spare the State. Vance’s criticisms are disingenuous at the least --- can any resisting enemy expect no reaction from their adversary? 

Governor Zebulon B. Vance of North Carolina was an ardent States' Rights advocate who worked against the policies of the central government in Richmond. He often refused to let North Carolinian regiments leave the State, tithed all foreign imports to the Confederacy, fought national conscription laws, nullified the suspension of Confederate habeas corpus, and cordially disliked Jefferson Davis on a personal level.

Sherman, for his part, is not swayed by Vance’s remarks.