JULY 17, 1864
The Battle of Snicker’s Ferry (The Battle of Cool Spring):
A small Union force of 5,000 tries to waylay Jubal Early’s 14,000-man force which is retreating from Washington. The Union force is comprised of infantry only, and is overwhelmed by Early’s cavalry and artillery. The Union suffers 500 casualties (mostly killed); the Confederacy suffers 400 casualties (mostly wounded).
James B. Stebbins and Myron E. Stowell, both from Deerfield, Massachusetts, both members of Deerfield’s First Congregationalist Church, and both Union men, were both killed on May 18th 1864, 1,000 miles apart. Stebbins was killed at Yellow Bayou, Louisiana. Stowell was killed at Spotsylvania Court House. Today, Deerfield holds a memorial service for them in which the officiant, Reverend Perkins K. Clarke, called upon the community to renew its faith in "Christian combat."
General Joseph E. Johnston C.S.A. is peremptorily relieved of command of the Army of Tennessee by an angry Confederate President Jefferson Davis:
You failed to arrest the advance of the enemy to the vicinity of Atlanta, far in the interior of Georgia, and express no confidence that you can defeat or repel him, you are hereby relieved from command of the Army and Department of Tennessee, which you will immediately turn over to General Hood.
The one-armed, one-legged General John Bell Hood, who has been angling for Johnston’s command for some time, is named to replace him.
Almost since Fort Sumter, Johnston and Davis have been at odds, and when the news breaks, the Richmond newspapers blame the act on the increasingly disliked Davis’ “cold snaky hate” for Johnston, who is a popular commander. Johnston’s dismissal causes a spike in Confederate desertions.
In truth, there is more to Johnston’s removal than “cold snaky hate”. Over the course of the Spring and Summer, Johnston has allowed his army to be pushed all the way from the municipal boundaries of Chattanooga to the municipal boundaries of Atlanta. The “Second City of The South” is now facing seizure by the Federals under General William Tecumseh Sherman.
In some ways the battlefield interactions of Sherman and Johnston mirror those of Generals Grant and Lee in Virginia. The two armies have pirouetted around each other for 120 miles, about twice the distance Grant gained on Lee. With every move, Johnston has been forced to move his army into a blocking position in front of Sherman’s.
Unlike Grant’s Overland Campaign however, Sherman’s Atlanta Campaign has been relatively --- relatively --- bloodless. There has been much low-level skirmishing, but few of the massive high-energy set-piece assaults that marked Grant’s interactions with Lee. For the last hundred miles, he has been seeking a place to stand and fight --- indeed he found one on May 20th, at Allatoona, Georgia, where he was set for a large battle, but was flummoxed when Sherman declined his invitation to dance by making a wide flanking movement around him. Johnston had to scramble to catch up to Sherman. When Johnston does fight --- as he did at Kennesaw Mountain --- he does well.
Grant is quiet and pugnacious. Lee is thoughtful and aggressive. Sherman is ferocious and reflective. Johnston is militant and intelligent.
Despite Sherman’s ferocious reputation and Johnston’s militant one, neither commander wants to waste a man, and Johnston particularly does not want to waste a shot.
Johnston’s tendency to withdraw rather than fight has given him the reputation of being the George B. McClellan of the South. But very unlike McClellan, Johnston is not just imagining a massive force before him --- he sees it with his own eyes. Sherman’s army began the Atlanta Campaign with 100,000 men. Losses and garrisoning have reduced his effectives to about 85,000.
Johnston, who began the Campaign with roughly 40,000 men has had to detach some thousands to bolster Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, and has lost more to combat and illness. He has perhaps now 22,000 effectives, a shrunken supply train, and like Lee before Richmond and Petersburg, no place to go except in front of the enemy.
Still, Lee has a larger army than Johnston (even though a reserve pool no longer exists), and can risk more. So, unlike Lee with Grant, Johnston fears to throw his entire force into a fray with Sherman. To lose men in any numbers will be the doom of the Confederacy in the Western Theatre. Johnston is cognizant of the fact that a costly set-piece battle with Sherman (even if he wins the day) could reduce The Army of Tennessee to little more than a Jubal Early-sized strike force; and then, in the foreseeable future, a replenished Union army could crush him at its leisure. Johnston has been utterly unwilling to allow that.
Atlanta is critical to holding the lower South. Though it is not yet the political capital of Georgia, the very new city is the economic and manufacturing capital. Founded in 1837, it is the railroad hub of the Deep South, one of the few places where a large manufacturing infrastructure exists, and has a burgeoning population of over 10,000, including most of the South’s Captains of Industry. The loss of Atlanta will be a psychological blow as well, perhaps equal to the loss of Richmond itself.
All this is at risk. In short, if Atlanta falls, Georgia falls, and the South falls with them. This puts iron into the backs of Atlanta’s defenders.
And then, just as Joseph E. Johnston is about to make his stand, John Bell Hood takes his place.
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| Marietta Street, Atlanta GA, 1864 |
